ABSTRACT Solving a system of multivariate quadratic equations obtained through algebraic cryptanalysis is a nondeterministic polynomial time-complete problem. Owing to the trend of stream ciphers based on nonlinear update, the success of algebraic attacks has been limited to their reduced variants. On the other hand, side channel attacks (SCAs), although require a continued access to the target device for capturing leakages, are a potent threat against the stream ciphers. Algebraic SCA (ASCA) combines and solves equations obtained through algebraic cryptanalysis and partial SCA of cipher implementation. ASCA is successfully being applied against block ciphers since 2009; however, there is no existing published work on ASCA against stream ciphers as per our knowledge. In this paper, we propose an idea of mounting ASCA on stream ciphers, and we demonstrated it through the application of ASCA on trivium and grain stream ciphers.
I. INTRODUCTION
Algebraic attacks on stream ciphers, as introduced by Courtois and Meier in 2003, attempted to solve a system of multivariate polynomial equations obtained from the association of internal state bits and few output stream bits [1] . This subsequently led to the efficient retrieval of internal state bits or secret key in case of low-degree equations. Courtois also proved existence of low-degree annihilator functions against Boolean functions, which led to reduction of overall complexity of algebraic attacks. Numerous literatures on the subject can be found, such as in [2] - [6] . However, nonlinearity in the state update of stream ciphers through employment of nonlinear feedback shift register (NLFSR) or nonlinear combiner functions eventually became a common feature, thereby greatly increasing the degree of generated equations and decreasing the computational feasibility of their corresponding algebraic attacks. Therefore, it can be safely concluded that the success of algebraic attack against stream ciphers has been confined to toy ciphers and round-reduced variants of popular stream ciphers in spite of evolving techniques to resolve multivariate quadratic equation (MQ) problem such as relinearization [7] , extended linearization [8] , sparse extended linearization [9] , Groebner bases [10] , and Boolean satisfiability (SAT) solving. Stream ciphers based on LFSRs, such as Sfinks [11] and WG [12] , were dropped in the second and third phases of Project eSTREAM [13] , respectively. NLFSR-based stream ciphers proved to be highly resistant against algebraic attacks, as the degree of underlying algebraic equations increased with clocking of registers. The authors in [14] demonstrated that after about 80 equations against Grain v1 stream cipher were obtained through an algebraic attack, the degree of the equations rose to as high as 160. Clock-controlled stream ciphers, such as A5/1, possess impressive resistance against algebraic cryptanalysis as well [15] . Algebraic attacks against modern stream ciphers, therefore resort to guessing few bits and in some cases specific guessed bits lead to better results [16] , [17] .
Side Channel Analysis (SCA), on the other hand, has been more successful against stream ciphers when compared with algebraic attack; however, SCA is not as common as algebraic attack [18] , [19] . In [18] and [20] , the authors have mounted a successful differential power attack (DPA) both against Trivium and Grain ciphers. In [21] , the authors demonstrated the concept of template attack by successfully applying it against RC4 stream cipher. In [22] , the susceptibility of eSTREAM ciphers towards SCA was comprehensively evaluated, and a theoretical approach, which shows that all eSTREAM ciphers were vulnerable to SCA, was adopted.
As recent popular stream ciphers based on nonlinear update functions are highly resistant against algebraic attacks but are reasonably vulnerable to SCA leads to a logical speculation that some side channel leakage information from stream cipher implementation might augment the algebraic equations obtained from an algebraic attack in a way to make the solving easier. In our study, we investigated this theory, which eventually turned out to be a valid one.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Works related to current research are briefly discussed in Section II. A generic model of our proposed attack is presented in Section III. We applied ASCA against a simple stream cipher as a proof of concept in Section IV. Thereafter, we used popular stream ciphers, such as Trivium and Grain, to demonstrate the efficacy of ASCA in Sections V and VI, respectively. The summary of our results is presented in Section VII. Lastly, the concluding remarks and future work possibilities are mentioned in Section VIII.
II. RELATED WORK
To our knowledge, our work is the first to deal with the application of ASCA against stream ciphers, although it can be related to researches on ASCA against block ciphers. Renauld and Standaert [23] proposed to combine algebraic cryptanalysis with SCA in 2009. They successfully applied ASCA against reduced and extended versions of the PRESENT cipher [24] and observed that the resolution time varied linearly with the number of rounds. To demonstrate the efficacy of ASCA, they assumed to extract exact values of hamming weights at the input and output of S-boxes in all rounds in a single trace. Resultantly, the algebraic equations, combined with hamming weight leakage equations of 8-, 16-, 24-, 32-and 64-round PRESENT ciphers, were resolved using SAT solvers in average times of 0.39, 0.98, 1.5, 2.5 and 7 seconds, respectively. From 2009 onwards, ASCA against block ciphers drew the interest of researchers, especially through the improvement of its error-tolerance. In [25] , the authors applied ASCA on advanced encryption standard (AES) and highlighted that most of the notions existing for PRESENT cipher can be noted against unprotected implementation of AES on an 8-bit micro-controller. They recovered an AES key after observing a single encryption operation through ASCA. In [26] , the authors emphasized that errors in side channel information to be incorporated in ASCA, makes the SAT problem unsatisfiable; therefore, they recommended the usage of pseudo-Boolean optimizers (PBOPTs) instead of SAT solvers for ASCA in the presence of errors. Optimizers also take into account some additional logical constraints during solving. Another error-tolerant technique that deals with inaccurate side channel measurements in ASCA, which is known as multiple deductions-based ASCA (MDASCA), was introduced in [27] . In [28] , the authors presented a novel notion of algebraic immunity for designing ASCA resistant S-boxes. Furthermore, the authors in [29] presented an improved ASCA on AES; whereas in [30] , in addition to optimizers and solvers comparison in terms of robustness and speed, the authors proposed to search for leakage models, aside from hamming weight, ASCA application. Moreover, in another study regarding ASCA on AES [31] , the authors established an error rate threshold that can be tolerated using an optimizer; and they claimed to have recovered an AES key in ten hours with 20% error rate from an average of 100 measurements. In [32] , the authors attacked an AES key using a template attack combined with ASCA in accessing an exceedingly restricted implementation device. Another study on error-tolerant ASCA used a constraint programming compiler called BEE (Ben-Gurion University Equi-propagation Encoder) [33] . Furthermore, in [34] , as the authors were attacking AES, side channel information along with measurement noise were added into equation set obtained through algebraic attack, and solved as a PBOPT instance.
Another line of research that can be related to our work is the exploitation of side channel leakage information from cipher implementation. SCA targets the implementation of ciphers by exploiting power leakage, electromagnetic radiations, execution time, photonic emissions, etc. Timing analysis is possible if there is an existing relationship between execution time of algorithm and its internal states [35] . A cipher might be susceptible to timing attack if its algorithm has some conditional branch instructions or table look ups. In case of power analysis, hamming weight or hamming distance information are captured from the leaked power traces. Algorithmic noise due to hardware implementation can also be advantageous to an attacker. Simple power analysis (SPA) takes advantage of the relationship between instant power consumption and internal states in one or few power traces [36] . DPA exploits the difference in power consumption due to variation in the data being processed with same key. Albeit, it may not be practically possible to restart the operation of stream cipher, researchers have used scenarios wherein frequent resynchronization is needed [37] . In template attacks, the adversary acquires an exact replica of the encryption device that executes the stream cipher [21] . This is a reasonable assumption, as standard micro-controllers are used quite often for this purpose. In the first phase, separate templates of typical signal are captured and recorded along with the associated noise against all possible key values, using the replica device. In the second phase, a single leakage trace is required from the actual device, to match with recorded template to reach the exact key. Instead of performing this classification process on the entire key space extend-andprune strategy is recommended to be used iteratively. The issues that are related to template attacks have been discussed in detail in [38] .
In this paper, we propose the application of ASCA against stream ciphers for the first time. We demonstrated the application of ASCA, through the transformation of partial side channel leakage information from implementation of target VOLUME 5, 2017 ciphers into conjunctive normal form (CNF) clauses; and we added these said clauses to those obtained from conventional algebraic attack technique and were subsequently inputted to SAT solver. The SAT solving results of ASCA against Crypto-1, Bivium-B, Trivium and Grain v1 stream ciphers using CryptoMiniSAT 5.0 lead to successful results -0.158, 11.531, 21.54 and 28.25 seconds, respectively -which, by far, are the most satisfactory results ever published using a modest Linux desktop computer. 
III. PROPOSED ATTACK METHODOLOGY
The sequence of ASCA steps on stream ciphers can be summarized through a flowchart, as shown in Fig 1. A brief introduction of the underlying concept is also presented in [39] .
Sole algebraic attack has offline and online phases of execution. In the offline phase, target stream cipher is transformed into a system of multivariate equations; whereas in the online phase, the adversary needs sufficient output stream bits that depend on the unknown variables, to solve algebraic equations. Normally, stream ciphers have an initialization phase wherein no output bit is generated. Generally, algebraic attacks target complete internal state bits and subsequently reach the secret key through backtracking. However, secret key can also be directly targeted prior to initialization. In the former case, the number of unknowns would be greater, but the equations would be of lesser degree; whereas in the latter case, the equations would be of higher degree but with lesser unknowns.
In ASCA methodology the equations obtained from algebraic attack phase are not solved until additional equations from partial SCA are added into them.
In a full SCA, sufficient leakage information is obtained to find the complete key. However, partial SCA, as constituent of ASCA, aims to extract only adequate information, thus making the solving of the system of equations obtained earlier through algebraic attack tractable. Analyzing the leakage pattern of the cipher implementation to select leakage points or models that extract optimal information with minimal access to the device can make the overall attack more efficient.
There may be a case in which in spite of side channel information addition, the overall system of equations/clauses is not solved in reasonable time (a threshold of 3,600 seconds was considered in our study). In such a scenario, more information from SCA can be extracted, leakage points/model can be altered, and algebraic attack part can be revisited by capturing more output stream bits. 
IV. ASCA AGAINST CRYPTO-1 AS PROOF OF CONCEPT
Crypto-1 stream cipher, as shown in Fig 2 [40] , consists of a single 48-bit LFSR, which is initialized with a 48-bit key. Then, five 4-bit sets from LFSR are fed into five three-degree nonlinear functions (f 0 , f 1 , .., f 4 ). If the input bits to these functions are denoted by a, b, c, and d, then, the functions are as follows:
The outputs of these five functions are fed into a fourdegree nonlinear final filter function, which generates the key stream:
Although Crypto-1 has already been broken down in 200 seconds through an algebraic attack on a PC, as demonstrated in [40] , it has been chosen in our study as an easy primary target to demonstrate as to how partial side channel information based on hamming weight leakage model can improve the solving time in ASCA as compared to algebraic attacks. In the offline phase, an algebraic attack was launched on the cipher, and 50 random samples of 50-bit output stream were utilized though grain-of-salt tool. It took an average of 509.017 seconds and 26.807 MBs of memory to solve the SAT problem composed of 24, 636 CNF clauses and to correctly assign values to unknown variables through CryptoMiniSat 5.0 on a Linux VM furnished with 2 processors and 2.8 GB memory. In the online phase, a template-like SCA, same as in [23] , was simulated to extract hamming weight leakage at the inputs of filter functions f 0 , f 1 , f 2 , f 3 , f 4 and final filter function. Algebraic equations can be obtained from hamming weight information through the procedure given in [28] ; however, in our study, this information was directly converted to CNF clauses as needed by the SAT solver. For example, for four inputs of function f 0 at time t, if hamming weight HW (t) = k, then product of any k + 1 or more bits will always be zero; and the value of k can be 0, 1, 2, 3, and 4 (i.e. |k| = 5). The possible CNF clauses for various values of k, where variables 1, 2, 3, and 4 were used as input bits to the function f 0 , are displayed in Table 1 .
Over a thousand CNF clauses thus acquired from SCA were added into the clauses obtained from algebraic attack, and the combined CNF file was inputted to CryptoMiniSAT 5.0 for satisfiability/assignment.
The experimental results of ASCA against the same 50 random samples of 50-bit output stream on the same machine as used for algebraic attack show that it took an average of 0.158 seconds and 6.204 MBs of memory to successfully complete the attack. A comparison drawn between ASCA and algebraic attack on Crypto-1 stream cipher, as demonstrated in Fig 3, clearly indicates the superiority of the former over the latter.
V. ASCA AGAINST BIVIUM-B AND TRIVIUM
Trivium stream cipher [41] has an internal state of 288 bits, composed of three nonlinear registers of 93, 84, and 111 bits, as illustrated in Fig 4. For initialization, the cipher is clocked 4 * 288 times; after the 80 bit secret key is loaded into the first register, 80-bit IV is loaded into the second register. The remaining states are loaded with zeros, except the ones in last three bits of the third register. The output stream is produced from a linear output function, which combines six internal state bits. The pseudocode of Trivium is shown in Algorithm 1. Algebraic attacks on Trivium in [42] - [48] targeted complete internal state bits instead of key. The best overall time and data complexity were found to be 2 42.5 and 2 12 , respectively, on an average computer in [42] that targeted a roundreduced variant of 625-round Trivium.
Bivium-B stream cipher, a reduced variant of Trivium (Fig 4) , has an internal state of 177 bits, composed of two nonlinear registers of 93 and 84 bits, initialized with 80-bit secret key and 80-bit IV, respectively, with zeros at remaining states. The cipher is clocked 4 * 177 times before the production of the output stream from a linear output function, which combines 4 bits out of 177 internal states [44] . The pseudocode of Bivium-B is shown in Algorithm 2. In [49] , the authors have claimed to break Bivium-B in an approximately 2 36.5 seconds using a Xeon E5345 @2.33GHz computer with the help of grain-of-salt tool to generate CNF clauses from pure algebraic attack and to solve them using CryptoMiniSat [50] . To our knowledge, this is the most efficient algebraic attack against Bivium-B that has ever been reported.
Algorithm 2
Our ASCA on Bivium-B/Trivium targeted 80-bit secret key instead of the complete state of cipher after the initialization, while capturing 80 output bits. The success of ASCA on Bivium-B/Trivium stream ciphers or any other cipher is largely dependent on the availability of leakage points in the hardware implementation of the cipher so that maximum possible side channel information could be extracted through minimum exposure. By looking at the design of both ciphers, the SCA that is similar to the method employed against Crypto-1 cipher appears to offer no advantages. One may attempt to capture hamming weight of registers at each round in a template-like attack and convert them into algebraic equations or CNF clauses; however, due to the large size of the registers, entropy of hamming weights could be very high as well [51] . Therefore, the equations based on hamming weights of registers would not extensively reduce the overall complexity of ASCA. In [22] , the authors assessed the susceptibility of Trivium over SCA, and they concluded that its power consumption can be easily described using a hamming distance model. They also highlighted that there is almost no possibility of recovering internal states after the initialization phase, as the key spreads into all the registers; thus, useful side channel information can only be extracted in the initialization phase. This is applicable to Bivium-B as well, as it has the same inherent structure. Moreover, the authors suggested that a DPA can be mounted while focusing on the s 94 input of second register. The contents of this flipflop after each round are given by following equation from pseudocode (line 8 for Bivium-B and line 10 for Trivium as above):
As we subjected Bivium-B and Trivium ciphers to a known IV attack; therefore only the unknown on the right hand side of the above mentioned equation was s 66 (i), corresponding to the 66 th bit of secret key in round 1. In a DPA, two hypothetical power consumptions of the second register, using both (0 and 1) values for s 94 , can help in determining its correct value with correlation coefficient. Consequently, an additional equation or few CNF clauses from SCA were obtained, and it can augment the system of equations or CNF clauses obtained through classic algebraic attack.
For the next round, s 94 will assume a new value, but the rest of the bits of second register were known, thus DPA can be continued in a similar manner and the correct values for s 94 in the subsequent equations of the succeeding rounds can be placed. How many values of s 94 or how many roundequations are needed? We aimed to involve all 80 secret key bits in these equations and proceeded until round 66, which is adequate for both Bivium-B and Trivium. The resulting equations based on following expressions were acquired and were either equal to 1 or 0, depending on the value of s 94 as per DPA outcome: 13 For SCA, only equations from the first 66 rounds were utilized; however, for algebraic attack, the complete initialization phase (4 * 177 rounds in case of Bivium-B and 4 * 288 rounds in case of Trivium) was needed to be included, aside from the 80 additional rounds for 80 output bits. This was done to employ variables introduced for initial state bits in the new equations, which demonstrate the relationship between output and state bits. The inclusion of initialization phase in the algebraic attack poses the disadvantage of dealing with high-degree equations but, at the same time, has an advantage of targeting lesser unknown variables of secret key bits only instead of complete state bits. In ASCA, as leakage information was obtained in the initialization phase, leakage information has to be included in the algebraic attack phase as well.
The CNF clauses obtained from both algebraic and SCA phases were combined and were inputted into CryptoMiniSat 5.0 for satisfiability/assignment.
The results of ASCA against Bivium-B and Trivium, as summarized in Fig 5 and [52] . The output h i of a threedegree nonlinear function H, which obtains five input bits from both registers, is XORed with a linear function σ i to generate the output stream z i . During initialization phase, which lasts for 160 rounds, δ = 1, hence no output stream is generated and z i is XORed with the feedback functions of both registers. The following equations govern the operation of the cipher:
• Feedback functions of s and b: • Linear function f i :
• Three-degree nonlinear function h i :
However, no adequate researches on algebraic cryptanalysis of Grain v1 have been accomplished. Although Grain v1 has been subjected to other attacks, such as those in [53] - [55] , only one instance of pure algebraic attack against Grain v1 has been published [17] , which claimed to have solved Grain v1 equations in 2 80.70 seconds, using the Groebner bases technique.
Similar to the attacks on other ciphers in previous sections, Grain v1 was converted into CNF clauses through the help of grain-of-salt tool using 80 output stream bits [49] . The initialization phase, which consisted of 160 rounds, was included in the attack, as we intended to directly target the secret key instead of targeting complete 160 state bits.
In [22] , the authors mentioned that Grain v1 is susceptible to SPA in case of bit-serialized implementations through the subsequent measurement of key bits hamming distances after resetting to a defined state at key setup. However, in [18] , Fischer et al. mounted a successful DPA with chosen IV while attacking the key setup process and thereby learning the key bits iteratively. The authors in [22] also mentioned that a DPA could possibly be mounted specifically before or after the output function based on hamming distance model.
A. UNSUCCESSFUL ATTEMPT
In this attempt in a known IV scenario, new incoming bit of LFSR in each round was targeted knowing that all 80 bits of the LFSR b are initially known at round 0. A correlation DPA can measure the value of new bit in the subsequent rounds through all known LFSR bits in the previous round, which are as follows:
• From the equations given above, it can be observed that in round 1, b 80 would be equal to:
• All the bits coming from LFSR with suffix b were known from the previous round, therefore the value of b 80 becomes: 
• b 80 can be simplified further as:
• If the value of b 80 was measured as b through correlation DPA, then one of the two possible equations can be obtained for each round during the initialization phase as either: -For k 2 = 1: s 1 ⊕s 2 ⊕s 4 ⊕s 10 ⊕s 31 ⊕s 43 ⊕s 56 ⊕s 63 = b ⊕ k 1 -For k 2 = 0: s 1 ⊕s 2 ⊕s 4 ⊕s 10 ⊕s 31 ⊕s 43 ⊕s 56 = b⊕k 1
• After the initialization phase, the value of b 80 was only determined from LFSR bits as under:
Therefore side channel equations targeting b 80 would only be useful until the end of initialization phase. One-hundred sixty equations thus obtained through SCA were added into the CNF clauses already obtained. However, none of the 50 samples resulted into a satisfiable solution within our time limit, which is 3,600 seconds.
B. SUCCESSFUL ATTEMPT
As per our attack model, shown in Fig 1 in Section III, in case of unsuccessful or inefficient solving, one must revisit either of the constituent attack phases. In this case, we changed the leakage points in partial SCA phase and captured the leakage at the input of function h i . This kind of Grain v1 susceptibility was also pointed out by authors in [22] ; however, no study regarding practical SCA on Grain v1 exploiting this leakage has been published so far. We simulated a template-like SCA at the input of h i using a hamming weight leakage model [21] . Hamming weight information of these bits can either be converted to algebraic equations as explained in [28] or be directly converted to CNF clauses as explained in Section IV. Here, it was directly converted into CNF clauses and was added to the previously obtained CNF clauses from algebraic attack. Moreover, at this instance, the CryptoMiniSAT 5.0 was able to give satisfiability/assignment, in an average of 28.25 seconds using 17.26 MBs of memory for 50 samples using the same machine as used for Trivium above. The summary of results is presented in Fig 7 and Table 3 .
VII. ANALYSIS OF RESULTS
The successful application of ASCA against popular stream ciphers, such as Trivium and Grain, as demonstrated above, proves the efficacy of our proposed technique and model. Lone algebraic attacks were never successful against the full versions of either Trivium or Grain stream ciphers, and it can be attributed to the high complexity of the generated MQ problem. This high complexity is the consequence of built-in nonlinearity in the design of such stream ciphers. Algebraic attack phase, as a constituent of ASCA against Trivium and Grain, was mounted until the formulation of multivariate quadratic equations. The resultant MQ problem was computationally infeasible for solving using any existing mathematical method or tool. The main advantage of ASCA over pure algebraic attack is the additional equations obtained from SCA. SCA is only possible if leakage information from a cipher implementation is available. It is next to impossible to implement a stream cipher without any sort of leakage. This leakage information, once converted into algebraic equations or CNF clauses and included into overall MQ problem or SAT problem, may successfully render ASCA as computationally feasible. Tables 4 and 5 summarize the results of our experiments on Crypto-1, Bivium-B, Trivium and Grain v1 and show the comparison with full-blown SCA and lone algebraic attacks respectively. Table 4 highlights the comparison between the previously launched full-blown SCA with partial SCA information for ASCA against the stream ciphers under discussion. The SCA leakage model we employed in our study is as per the previous works. However, the extent of partial SCA information, which can be ascertained from the number of CNF clauses obtained in the process, is less as compared to complete SCA, which is unable to singularly find the secret key or internal state. The limited side channel information in our study is satisfactory. Traditional SCA targets complete key bits by demanding continuous access to the implementation device to acquire a greater number of power traces. However, partial SCA, as part of ASCA, needs limited access to the hardware device to acquire single or few traces as it has an easier target of a few relations translating into algebraic equations or CNF clauses. These supporting equations or clauses further defined and simplified the system of equations/clauses obtained through algebraic attack. The comparison of lone algebraic attacks with the ASCA on the stream ciphers is presented in Table 5 . It elucidates the colossal reduction of the complexity of overall ASCA, in which only a few CNF clauses or algebraic equations from partial SCA were added into those obtained from lone algebraic attack. The addition of equations/clauses from partial SCA not only makes the system of equations excessively defined but it also simplified the equations in terms of degree and, occasionally, in terms of the number of unknowns. There may be a case where partial SCA information is inadequate and thus the MQ problem or SAT problem would remain intractable. In such cases, either the amount of partial SCA information may be increased or the SCA leakage points/model may be changed altogether; and this was amply demonstrated while attacking Grain cipher, wherein the first ASCA attempt was not able to yield results within the time limit.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
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